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In literary criticism, narrative is associated with diegesis, or the telling of a story. 
By contrast, mimesis shows a story, re-presenting the story as if in a mirror. In 
Republic, Plato1 distinguishes between diegesis and mimesis, writing: 
 
[The] assimilation of [the poet] to another, either by the use of 
voice or gesture, is the imitation of the person whose character he 
assumes[.] 
[…] 
Then in this case the narrative of the poet may be said to proceed 
by way of imitation[.] 
[…] 
Or, if the poet everywhere appears and never conceals himself, 
then again the imitation is dropped, and his poetry becomes simple 
narration. (Book III; 188)  
 
When the poet acknowledges his role as narrator, he narrates diegetically. When 
the poet conceals himself as narrator (re-presents the story as, or becomes the story, 
“himself”), he “narrates” mimetically. Because it is predicated on the idea of 
narrative (story-telling), diegesis recognizes its narrativity. However, in replicating 
the story without the precondition of narrativity, mimesis does not recognize its 
narrativity; it is a non-narrative in the sense that it is a narrative, yet it does not 
appear to be one. By re-presenting a story, a mimetic narrative suggests an alternate 
non-narrated story as veracious in appearance as reality. That is, while diegesis 
admits its falseness by acknowledging its narrativity, mimesis pretends to and 
confuses reality by introducing a false, but believable, story. 
 
Narrative in the Platonic sense occupies the diegetic realm and is innocuous 
inasmuch as it limits itself from transcending its narrativity. However, narrative is 
more than a fictional story; it is the act of epistemologically ordering experience. 
In “Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm,” Walter Fisher identifies the 
paradigmatic importance of narration when he defines narration as “a theory of 
symbolic actions—words and/or deeds—that have sequence and meaning for those 
who live, create, or interpret them. The narrative perspective, therefore, has 
relevance to real as well as fictive worlds” (266). In so writing, Fisher reveals the 
re-presentational link between stories and reality and the centrality of this 
                                                 
1 Plato’s definition of mimesis is one of the earliest recorded; following Plato, definitions of mimesis 
have expanded its philosophical breadth, encompassing fields ranging from psychology to feminist 
studies. 
 relationship to the idea of narrative. Narrative acts a source of knowledge about 
reality because it re-presents reality in terms of its subjective apprehension. 
Because of its contingence with reality, epistemologies of narrative influence 
reality. When a narrative is used as a discursive tool with non-fictional (real) 
ramifications, it leaves the diegetic and enters the mimetic realm, seeking not only 
to tell a story (however false that story may be), but also to confuse reality with a 
re-presentation2 of reality. Narrative becomes mimetic when it advances a real 
discourse because its discursive intentions then target the non-fictional (mimetic) 
world. Narrative is diegetic inasmuch as it operates in acknowledgment of its 
narrative fictionality, but when narrative attempts to substitute a false3 reality for 
reality, it becomes mimetic. When it takes the form of a discursive tool with real 
ramifications, narrative can be understood as a false, yet seemingly true, story 
(henceforth, a non-narrative), occupying the mimetic (re-presentational) realm. 
Narrative becomes dangerous when it transcends its diegetic disposition and 
advances a mimetic non-narrative based on its intentions to subvert reality. 
 
Narrative is only narrative when it acknowledges its narrativity (when it 
occupies the diegetic, fictional realm); when it becomes mimetic and rejects its 
narrativity by falsely claiming reality (when it occupies the mimetic, non-fictional 
realm), narrative is better termed non-narrative, because it is a narrative that does 
not admit its narrativity. In their attempt to create a non-fictional correlate to the 
fictional idea of race, narratives of race operate in the mimetic realm and are, thus, 
non-narratives. I argue that narratives of race, in particular those that justify the 
superiority of whites to non-whites, are narratives of the mimetic type (non-
narratives), which, in their attempt to perpetuate racial inequality, narrate false 
realities of race and racial inequality. I examine the ways in which textual and visual 
narratives construct and sustain false realities (non-narratives) in order to establish 
and entrench the idea of race and racial difference. I argue that the non-narrative of 
race and racial inequality has been accepted and that its acceptance represents the 
danger of non-narratives to turn individuals away from reality and to impel them to 
subscribe to false realities. I conclude by examining the ways in which non-
narratives constitute meaningful realities and by suggesting that, because humans 
                                                 
2 I use “re-presentation” in the vein of bell hooks, who writes in “Representations of Whiteness in 
the Black Imagination,” “Like fictions, [stereotypes as representations] are created to serve as 
substitutions, standing in for what is real. They are there not to tell it like it is but to invite and 
encourage pretense” (44). I use “re-presentation” to mean the presentation of reality in a refracted 
light, so that the reality presented is not reality, but a distortion thereof.  
3 I use “false” to highlight the counterfeit nature of the narrated alternate reality, which is real in the 
sense that it exists, but which does not reflect the nature of true (in contradistinction to false) reality.  
 determine (narrate) reality, humans have the power to narrate realer non-narratives4 
of race.   
 
Mimetic narratives advance stories that falsely re-present a non-fictional 
reality. In “The Richmond Narratives,” Thomas Ross identifies the different 
narratives advanced in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.—notably, the narrative 
of Justice Antonin Scalia. Scalia’s narrative, in opposition to affirmative action, re-
presents a false version of reality in which affirmative action becomes, for minority 
groups, an instrument of oppression. Scalia writes regarding James Madison’s 
warning of the oppressive power of small majorities, such as black contractors: 
The prophesy of [Madison’s] words came to fruition in Richmond 
in the enactment of a set-aside clearly and directly beneficial to the 
dominant political group, which happens also to be the dominant 
racial group. The same thing has no doubt happened before in other 
cities (though the racial basis of the preference has rarely been made 
textually explicit)—and blacks have often been on the receiving end 
of the injustice. Where injustice is the game, however, turnabout is 
not fair play. (City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.) 
 
As Ross notes, Scalia’s narrative frames affirmative action as the “seed that will 
destroy whites,” because “[w]hen and where blacks are the dominant racial group, 
they will oppress whites” (85). Scalia’s narrative is predicated on the misconceived 
vengefulness of blacks and suggests that the implementation of affirmative action 
will result in the destruction of whites by blacks. Though he does not explicitly 
state it, Scalia’s circumspect language (“Where injustice is the game, however, 
turnabout is not fair play”) reveals the unnamed fear that blacks will retaliate for 
the injustices that they suffered. Scalia, moreover, appeals to the ideal of fairness 
(“turnabout is not fair game”), a catchword synonymous with the American tenet 
of “equality,” to suggest that black retaliation against whites, for its unfairness, 
infringes on what it means to be American. The implication of the narrative 
alienates blacks in their un-American-ness and suggests that blacks lust for revenge. 
Scalia re-presents reality by envisioning a reality of black dominance, catalyzed by 
affirmative action, and by implying that blacks are un-American because they do 
not conform to the American ideal of fairness, or equality; though the narrative is 
false, its believability (to the jurists) suggests that the false reality of Scalia’s non-
narrative could usurp reality. The presence of two believable realities, one true and 
one false, confuses the reader as to which reality is true. By re-presenting reality in 
a false way to jurists, Scalia’s “narrative” is a non-narrative that intentionally 
asserts a false reality and in so doing rejects any notion of fictional narrativity. The 
                                                 
4 In other words, non-narratives that reflect the reality of the unreality of race and racial inequality. 
I recognize the contradiction. 
 non-narrative not only affirms the idea of racial difference but also presumes a 
relationship of hostility between whites and blacks. 
 
Visual narratives of race, such as Annie Leibovitz’s April 2008 cover of 
Vogue, which features LeBron James and Gisele Bündchen, proliferate in the media 
and advance false realities of race and racial inequality. Critics have noted the 
visual allusion that Leibovitz’s cover makes to the Harry R. Hopps poster Destroy 
this Mad Brute: Enlist and to Georgio Olivetti’s 1949 poster of King Kong. Both 
references are to images of monstrosity, and James is aligned in posture and spatial 
position with both the brute and King Kong. Like the brute and King Kong, James 
is hunchbacked and has his feet set apart, a stance which enlarges his body in 
contrast to Bündchen (James occupies approximately three times the width of the 
cover that Bündchen occupies). James shows a conspicuous amount of teeth, like 
the brute and King Kong, which suggests carnivorousness, especially in association 
with the invocation of monstrosity. Like the two, James is black in skin and dress, 
a fact which, though it should not be significant, carries with it associations of 
danger and evil. The visual similarities between the photograph and the posters 
imply that James is of the type of the brute and King Kong—that he is a monster.  
 
The photograph emphasizes James’s “monstrosity” by contrasting it with 
Bündchen’s gentility, which corresponds to the gentility of the woman in Destroy 
this Mad Brute: Enlist and King Kong. Bündchen, moreover, resembles the Statue 
of Liberty in the color of her dress and in her posture, which features a slightly 
raised arm (though the right arm is not raised completely, as it is in the Statue of 
Liberty) and fingers closed as if she were holding a torch. As a visual icon of 
America, the comparison of the Statue of Liberty to Bündchen suggests that 
America itself is in the arms of the brute, King Kong, the monster. The photograph, 
by using real figures to allude to antecedent depictions of monstrosity and to a 
recognizable American icon, advances a re-presentation of reality (of real people) 
informed by a narrative that associates monstrousness with features of blackness, 
largeness, and carnivorousness. The narrative that the photograph advances is one 
that, though it suggests geniality between its figures, perpetuates a hierarchy in 
which the genteel white has greater connotative prestige than her monstrous black 
companion.  
 
The medium of photography (of capturing real images) contributes to the 
sense that the narrative re-presents reality. The image is believable because it 
narrates using real figures. The juxtaposition of James and Bündchen in the 
photograph emphasizes the contrast between a white female and a black male, a 
contrast which draws not only on racial difference but on gender difference as well. 
The image of a beautiful white female, whose posture resembles the Statue of 
 Liberty, suggests virtue and, in its connection to the Statue of Liberty, America. 
This virtue stands in contradistinction to the “brute”-like, 5  King Kong-like 6 
viciousness (read: vice) of James, whose posture underscores the impression of 
monstrosity. The association of virtue with Bündchen and vice with James causes 
the viewer to associate moral difference with racial difference (and gender 
difference, though the use of gender serves to underscore the helplessness of the 
white figure Bündchen and the aggressiveness of the black figure James; that is, 
gender punctuates a racial stereotype). The hierarchy implied by the juxtaposition, 
in which virtue is greater than vice and white is greater than black, finds expression 
in the subtle, yet significant, foregrounding of Bündchen and backgrounding of 
James. The narrative that the image advances is one in which a set of social values 
(color, gender, nationality—in two words, cultural normativity) is registered on a 
moral scale, which is then used to evaluate the two real figures in the image—
James, the viewer determines according to the associative criteria set forth by the 
photograph, is vicious, while Bündchen, representing characteristics associated 
with virtue, is virtuous and the moral superior to James. When viewers extrapolate 
the messages conveyed by the image, they apply the same criteria to their 
evaluations of others and, in perpetuation of the non-narrative of racial difference, 
reinforce the idea that blacks are (morally) inferior to whites. The photograph re-
presents reality by implying the existence of race as a true concept and of racial 
difference between persons of different colors. Because it seeks to undermine the 
reality that race does not exist (at least not as a biological reality; it is a social 
construct), the photograph does not acknowledge its narrativity; instead, it pretends 
to represent reality and to tell the true narrative of reality. The photograph of James 
and Bündchen, thus, constitutes a mimetic non-narrative that brutalizes blacks and 
gentrifies whites, and perpetuates the belief that white is superior to black.  
 
The consonance between the non-narratives of Scalia and Leibovitz reveals 
a narrative undercurrent to the history of race and racism in America. Both Scalia’s 
narrative and Leibovitz’s narrative narrate the existence of race and racial 
difference, and present paradigms of racial relations in which whites are morally 
superior to blacks. Scalia and Leibovitz present narratives which portray blacks as 
hostile outsiders, as monsters who can and will “destroy whites,” and as, overall, 
non-conformists to American ideals of fairness, or equality, and virtue. Both Scalia 
and Leibovitz perpetuate the idea of racial difference and underscore the differences 
between the races by politicizing relations between blacks and whites. The 
                                                 
5 The message of Destroy this Mad Brute: Enlist is particularly troubling, yet reflective of white-
black relations, for its message of violence toward the brute, which, in the photograph, is a black 
person. 
6 King Kong is native to “Skull Island,” a fictional island in the Pacific Ocean; the contrast of 
America and a “foreign” figure is xenophobic. 
 juxtaposition of blacks and whites (especially by Leibovitz) does not reveal the 
parity of the races; instead, it defines the races in contradistinction to each other, 
implying a hierarchy of power governed by principles of American normativity. As 
such, both Scalia and Leibovitz define American normativity in terms of whiteness, 
gentility, and fairness, and both present whiteness as something to be defended 
against black aggressors (blacks are vengeful and destructive, to Scalia, and blacks 
are monsters, to Leibovitz). The non-narratives of Scalia and Leibovitz, though 
temporally disconnected, commonly perpetuate racial difference according to a 
code of American normativity. The persistence of this non-narrative of American 
normativity until the present moment reveals the entrenchment of the non-narrative 
of racial difference and the associative register of (American) racism. Non-
narratives, it stands, have the power to institutionalize false realities of racial 
inequality. 
 
A paradigm for understanding narrative based on its position between 
diegetic and mimetic poles applies to narrative in general and can gauge the 
intentions and effects of a narrative. The scope of the paradigm encompasses all 
narratives, because the paradigm measures narrativity. As such, the paradigm is a 
useful definitional framework. However, the difficulty of understanding narrative 
based on its diegetic and mimetic qualities lies in determining whether a narrative 
is diegetic or mimetic. I have suggested that diegetic and mimetic narratives differ 
in their commitment to fictional and non-fictional goals. Yet the language of this 
metric does not account for the fact that fiction and non-fiction sometimes bleed 
together,7 confusing a sense of whether a narrative is diegetic or mimetic. A more 
useful distinction can be made between diegetic narratives and mimetic non-
narratives (such as narratives of race) by determining the extent to which a narrative 
acknowledges its narrativity and, subsequently, the extent to which it re-presents 
reality. The narratives of Scalia and Leibovitz present false versions of reality in 
which race and racial difference exist. The narratives that they advance do not 
recognize their falseness; instead, they rely on the pretense of reality to promote 
alternate realities of white superiority. The discursive nature of these narratives and 
their own narrative incognizance identify them as mimetic non-narratives, as 
opposed to narratives that acknowledge their narrativity. 
 
An understanding of narrative in terms of its mimetic or diegetic qualities 
simplifies the complexity of narrative and suggests that a diegetic narrative cannot, 
in the fictional realm, inform, for instance, the discourse surrounding race. Of 
course, the idea that diegetic narratives cannot act in discursive ways is false and 
represents a fault of the paradigm. The myth of Oedipus, for example, by admission 
                                                 
7 Plato notes this bleeding, writing, “And narration may be either simple narration, or imitation, or 
a union of the two?” (Book III; 186) 
 of its mythical nature, acknowledges its narrativity; yet, it has also given 
psychoanalysis one of its central paradigms. The difference between mimetic and 
diegetic narratives lies in the way in which diegetic narratives inform discourse. 
Whereas mimetic non-narratives attempt to confuse reality with alternate false 
realities, substituting false discourses (for example, discourses of racial inequality) 
for the discourse of reality, diegetic narratives, though their stories inform the 
discourse of reality, are limited by their admission of narrativity. While diegetic 
narratives have discursive potential, they are hindered by their acknowledgment of 
narrativity; the reader can identify diegetic narratives that admit their narrativity 
with greater ease than she can identify mimetic narratives, and with this knowledge 
she can resist the discursive implications of the narrative. Thus, while the paradigm 
suffers from its simplification of narrative into diegetic and mimetic types, it also, 
by providing the reader a measure of narrativity, provides the reader with the means 
to resist and render useless the discursive potential of diegetic narratives. 
 
I have conceived of narrative as a false reality in opposition to reality. Yet 
I have not defined reality per se, because to do so would validate one version of 
reality and invalidate the others. For example, race is not a real thing (a thing of 
reality) in the sense that it occurs naturally; rather, it is a social construction,8 a 
narrative that narrators narrate. Yet race as a false idea has become integrated into 
the reality of life. Though it is not real, race exists. Narratives of race have realized 
race and given it currency in reality. I have argued that narratives substitute false 
realities for reality. Yet, I cannot say that, in areas such as race where false realities 
have become reality, the false reality is any longer false, because it has become the 
reality that people know; it has become real. The idea that a narrative can constitute 
a meaningful reality suggests that reality does not exist in and of itself, but rather 
that it is perceptively constituted—that reality is, and exists because it is, perceived. 
If people perceive narrative to be reality, then narrative is reality. Thus, the 
relationship between narrative and reality as people know it may not be contentious, 
but rather constitutive, with narrative constituting meaningful reality. 
 
Narrative philosophers and linguistic theorists support the idea that reality 
is narratively constructed. In After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Alasdair 
MacIntyre writes, “man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, 
                                                 
8 In “AAPA [American Association of Physical Anthropologists] Statement on Biological Aspects 
of Race,” Solomon Katz writes, “Generally, the traits used to characterize a population are either 
independently inherited or show only varying degrees of association with one another within each 
population. Therefore, the combination of these traits in an individual very commonly deviates from 
the average combination in the population. This fact renders untenable the idea of discrete races 
made up chiefly of typical representatives.” In so doing, he debunks the misconception that race has 
a genetic basis.   
 essentially a story-telling animal” (201). The proclivity of humans for narration in 
both “practice” and “fiction” suggests that both the fictional and non-fictional 
worlds of “man” are narratively constituted. Mimetic non-narratives of reality are 
subjective interpretations of reality re-presented as reality. Thereby, reality 
becomes less about its inherent reality-ness and more about its constitutive-
apprehension by humans (humans constitute meaningful reality by apprehending, 
interpreting, and re-presenting their subjective perceptions of meaningless reality). 
Reality is nothing more than a narration, the greatest mimetic non-narrative told. In 
“Science and Linguistics,” Benjamin Lee Whorf advances a theory that suggests 
that language shapes thought. He writes:  
 
[T]he background linguistic system… of each language is not 
merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but rather is itself 
the shaper of ideas…. We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, 
and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to 
an agreement to organize it in this way. (117) 
 
Whorf argues that language shapes how individuals perceive reality. His argument, 
though contested, suggests a constitutive relationship between language and reality, 
similar to the constitutive relationship between narrative and reality posited above. 
If language can shape reality, then it stands to reason that narrative (the ordering of 
lexical and visual language into a story) can also shape reality. The realization of 
the false reality of race suggests that reality may be a narrative, as narratives of race 
are responsible for presenting the false reality of race. If reality is a narrative, then 
it is a mimetic non-narrative that does not acknowledge its narrativity because it 
doubly functions as reality. Yet, if reality is a narrative and if narrative is the re-
presentation of a narrative reality, discursively informing reality, then the narratives 
we tell have the power to reconstitute and re-narrate reality and to deconstruct the 
narrated reality of race and racial inequality. 
 
The suggestion that narratives constitute reality finds an example in Naomi 
Zack’s recent remarks about the effectiveness of the Black Lives Matter 
nomenclature. Zack notes that the expression Black Lives Matter is a statement of 
fact and that “no one would claim that black lives […] do not matter.” Underlying 
her claim, however, is the fact that the phrase Black Lives Matter needs to be 
articulated. The state of reality (the reality of racial violence9) does not reflect an 
appreciation of black lives, nor does it reflect an appreciation of lives in general. 
Zack’s claim that “no one would claim that black lives […] do not matter” 
                                                 
9 The Federal Bureau of Investigation notes that 48.2% of hate crimes (~3956 crimes) were racially 
motivated, and that 70.0% of racially motivated hate crimes (~2764 crimes) were the result of anti-
black bias (“Hate Crime Statistics [2010]”). 
 represents a capitulation, on her part, to the non-narrative of equality (the non-
narrative to which Scalia appeals). In reality (I mean reality, not a mimetic reality), 
there are people to whom black lives do not matter, or do not matter to the degree 
that white lives matter, which amounts to the same thing. A white person will kill 
a black person if he (the white person) believes that the black person poses a threat. 
When officers Timothy Loehmann and Frank Garmback shot and killed Tamir 
Rice, whom they believed carried a firearm (it was an Airsoft gun), Rice’s life did 
not matter as much as their own (white) lives did; Loehmann and Garmback did 
not consider Rice’s life with the weight that they considered their own. Zack, who 
criticizes the discourse (non-narrative) that creates the illusion of equality, claims 
that equality does not exist, but fails to recognize the non-narrative (false reality) 
of equality to which she, in stating that “no one would claim that black lives […] 
do not matter,” subscribes. Zack’s subscription to a mimetic, non-narrated, false 
reality of equality demonstrates the deceptive, yet also constitutive, relationship 
between narrative and reality, in which the non-narrative of racial equality 
constitutes Zack’s meaningful reality. 
 
The concept of narrative is usefully framed in terms of its diegetic and 
mimetic qualities. An understanding of narrative based on these qualities 
categorizes narrative by examining the extent to which it acknowledges its 
narrativity and re-presents reality. Though they have discursive potential, diegetic 
narratives acknowledge their narrativity and do not re-present reality. By contrast, 
mimetic non-narratives seek to create alternate realities by presenting false versions 
of reality. In particular, narratives of race, such as the narratives of Scalia and 
Leibovitz, present versions of reality in which the false ideas of race and racial 
inequality exist. By not acknowledging their narrativity, these narratives (non-
narratives) assume the appearance of reality. The non-narrativity of the narrative—
its denial of narrativity and its pretension to reality—enables the mimetic non-
narrative to act in a discursive capacity, capable in its resemblance to reality of 
confusing what is true (the non-existence of race10) with what is false (the idea of 
race). The closeness of the relationship between narrative and reality, in which 
narrative becomes, for all intents and purposes, reality, suggests that the former 
constitutes the latter, if not exactly, then meaningfully. Theories of narration and 
language suggest that humans narrate their realities and that the only meaningful 
realities are the subjective, interpreted re-presentations of meaningless reality. 
Thus, narratives of race propose realities of race and racial difference. However, if 
reality is a narrative (a mimetic non-narrative), then narrators have the power to re-
narrate reality to reflect a reality more faithful to and conscious of the unreality of 
race and racial inequality. Though it can only offer a necessarily false image of 
                                                 
10 I recognize the paradox. 
 reality, the looking-glass affords the only means of attaining, through re-
presentation, true reality. 
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